BANKS, FS (now P/O) Jack Standish (Can 11620) - Distinguished Flying Medal - No.9 Squadron (unit not given in AFRO) - Award effective 13 April 1942 as per London Gazette dated 14 April 1942 and AFRO 611/42 dated 24 April 1942. Born at Torbrook Mines, Nova Scotia, 23 August 1917; home there or East Angus, Quebec (carpenter and electrician for three years); enlisted in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 14 September 1939 for General Duties and taken on strength of No.5 (BR) Squadron for work in Accounts Section. Promoted AC1, 14 March 1940. Reverted to AC2 and posted to No.1 WS, Montreal, 25 May 1940. To No.1 BGS, Jarvis, 27 October 1940. Graduated as WAG and promoted Sergeant, 25 November 1940. To RAF, 15 December 1940, taken on strength of United Kingdom, 26 December 1940. To No.75 Squadron, 6 January 1941. To No.214 Squadron, 10 January 1941; to No.11 OTU, 21 January 1941. To No.9 Squadron, 20 April 1941. Promoted Flight Sergeant, 1 September 1941. Struck off strength of No.9 Squadron, 2 February 1942. Repatriated to Canada, 16 February 1942; to No.1 WS, 7 March 1942 for a refresher course. Commissioned 19 March 1942 (J15267). To No.6 ITS, Toronto, 23 May 1942. To No.20 EFTS, Oshawa, 1 August 1942; to No.5 SFTS, Brantford, 27 September 1942. Graduated as pilot, 5 February 1943. To \"Y\" Depot, 19 February 1943. To RAF overseas, 8 March 1943. Disembarked in United Kingdom, 17 March 1943. To No.20 (P) AFU, 4 May 1943. Killed in flying accident at No.20 (P) AFU, 3 June 1943 (Oxford V3821). Photo PL-15644 shows him back in Canada at commencement of pilot training. One night in January 1942 this airman was the front gunner of an aircraft which carried out a low level attack on the aerodrome at Schipol. Nearing the aerodrome a Dornier 217 was intercepted and Sergeant Banks coolly shot it down from close range. During the bombing run his aircraft was held in the searchlights but by his accurate fire Sergeant Banks extinguished two of them and at the same time warned his pilot, who was blinded by the glare, of the danger of colliding with a hangar. Throughout he displayed determination and resource. This airman has participated in thirty-one sorties over enemy and enemy occupied territory wherein targets have been attacked at important centres such as Dusseldorf, Hamm, Cologne, Kiel, Genda and Brest. NOTE: Public Record Office Air 2/9585 has recommendation dated 20 February 1942 when he had flown 31 sorties (181 hours five minutes). This listed his operations and gave a more detailed account of the events that led to his award: 27 May 1941 - Atlantic sweep for Prinz Eugen (8.45) 2 June 1941 - Dusseldorf (3.50) 11 June 1941 - Dusseldorf (5.00) 12 June 1941 - Hamm (4.05) 17 June 1941 - Dusseldorf (5.00) 19 June 1941 - Cologne (5.45) 25 June 1941 - Bremen (3.05) 30 June 1941 - North Sea sweep (5.30) 1 July 41 - Brest (6.25) 10 July 41 - Cologne (5.00) 14 July 41 - Bremen (6.00) 16 July 41 - Hamburg (7.05) 23 July 41 - Mannheim (6.10)) 25 Jul 41 - Hamburg (7.45) 12 August 1941 - Hanover (6.10) 14 August 1941 - Hanover (6.50) 19 August 1941 - Kiel (6.45) 26 August 1941 - Cologne (6.25) 29 August 1941 - Mannheim (7.30) 1 September 1941 - Cologne (5.50) 3 September 1941 - Brest (6.20) 7 September 1941 - Boulogne (3.00) 10 September 1941 - Turin (8.40) 12 September 1941 - Frankfurt (6.40) 15 September 1941 - Hamburg (7.05) 26 September 1941 - Genoa (1.50, recalled) 28 September 1941 - Genoa (10.00) 30 September 1941 - Stettin (9.20) 20 October 1941 - Kiel (5.15) 26 October 1941 - Hamburg (1.05, W/T failure) 21 January 1942 - Schipol (2.45) On the night of 21 January 1942 this Non-Commissioned Officer was front gunner in a Wellington aircraft detailed to carry out a low level attack on Schipol aerodrome. While approaching the aerodrome over the hangars he intercepted an enemy aircraft subsequently identified as a Dornier 217. He held his fire until the range was reduced to about 150 yards, then opened a burst when the aircraft was on the port bow and continued to fire until it was out of range on the port beam. The enemy aircraft was seen to crash in flames by the captain and the rear gunner, and is claimed as destroyed. The Wellington aircraft then proceeded to carry out its bombing run during which it was held by searchlights and height was reduced to fifty feet. Sergeant Banks succeeded by accurate fire in extinguishing two enemy searchlights and at the same time succeeded in warning the pilot who was blinded by the glare in time for him to avoid hitting the hangar. Throughout this action Sergeant Banks displayed the greatest coolness, determination and resource. This Non-Commissioned Officer has successfully completed 31 operational trips and is strongly recommended for the award of the Distinguished Flying Medal. Public Record Office Air 50/179 has Combat Report for the above action of 21/22 January 1942: Wellington Mark III, \"D\" of No.9 Squadron, X3305, on Soesterburg aerodrome with Schipol aerodrome as alternative, attacked Schipol aerodrome at 2057 hour, 400 feet, 260 I.A.S. Just before dropping bombs on a course of 220 in excellent visibility with no cloud and quarter moon directly on bow, saw enemy aircraft landing on flarepath beneath and ahead. Wellington opened fire from turret at very close range, incendiary bullets seen to pass through enemy aircraft and burn on ground beneath. Enemy aircraft then burst into flames and was left burning on the ground. Enemy aircraft carried one red and one green light on wing tips and one white light in front. It did not return fire. Owing to speed of Wellington\'s attack and enemy aircraft destruction, enemy aircraft not identified but claimed as destroyed. There were no casualties to Wellington or crew. Wellington continued its attack on aerodrome dropping 14 x 250 G.P. .025 T and 120 x 4 incendiaries across hangars and buildings on the north of the landing ground and fires from incendiaries were seen after leaving. In addition, three searchlights were shot out and one light gun emplacement silenced. Reclassification: Upon his return to Canada, he was posted to No.1 Wireless School, Montreal for a refresher course. On 23 April 1942, G/C F.A. Sampson (AFHQ) wrote to the Commanding Officer of No.1 WS: The marginally noted Officer was interviewed today by Director of Armament Training, Air Force Headquarters, who could not recommend him for armament instructor work. It appears that Pilot Officer Banks feels he should have a pilots course. Would you kindly have the Commanding Officer or Chief Instructor of your School submit a Confidential Report on this officer with any suggestions for future employment with particular reference to the taking of a Pilot\'s course. W/C R.M. Smith, Commanding Officer, No.1 Wireless School, replied on 29 April 1942: With reference to the marginally noted officer, I wish to advise that he was posted to No.1 Wireless School for a Refresher Course in Wireless, but due to his overseas operational experience, we find his mind is not tuned or fitted for this work. I have discussed this fully with the Chief Instructor and have also interviewed this Officer, and am of the opinion that he definitely is not fitted for wireless work. We strongly recommend that Pilot Officer Banks be given a Pilot\'s course as he is definitely pilot material, and with his operational background, should prove a steady and reliable pilot. Our Medical Staff have carried out an M.2 examination and find this Officer fit in all ways for pilot duties. He is single and twenty-five years of age. He has an excellent overseas record, having taken part in 31 raids over enemy territory. He volunteered for the thirty-first raid on which he won the Distinguished Flying Medal. In view of our association and discussion with this Officer, we feel confident that he should definitely be given an opportunity to take a Pilot\'s Course. For your information, whilst this Officer graduated from this School as a Wireless Operator Air Gunner, he was never called upon while overseas to use his knowledge of Morse, but was employed at all times as a straight Air Gunner. The last paragraph evoked some queries in AFHQ about training, an on 8 May 1942, F/L L.S. Caveney, writing on behalf of S/L E.A.D. Button (DTT/TW), reported: \"Re para 5 of minute 1, this practice prevails to a considerable extent. All WAGs on arrival in United Kingdom, after spending some time in a Receiving Centre, are posted to a Signals School for check-examination and refresher training, which is usually necessary. From information received from WAGs who have returned and letters from personnel overseas, it has been learned that whether a man remains a wireless operator (air gunner) or becomes \"straight\" air gunner depends upon his showing while at Signals School. If he is able to cope with the refresher training and attain the standards required, he is posted to an Operational Training Unit as a WAG. If, on the other hand, he is unable to reach the required proficiency, but makes an honest effort during his course, he is remustered to air gunner. If he fails his refresher course and by reason of attitude or conduct indicates that he does not desire to become a WAG, he is usually remustered to general duties.\" Training: Course at No.1 WS, 25 May 1940 to 28 October 1940. Spent one hours in Flying Classroom as First Operator, eleven hours in Flying Classroom on Listening Watch, and two hours in two-seat aircraft as sole operator. Placed ninth in a class of 56. Course at No.1 BGS, 28 October 1940 to 26 November 1940 involved flying on Battle aircraft, seven hours 15 minutes by day plus two hours 25 minutes as passenger. Gunnery marks as follows: Beam Test, 12 percent; Beam Relative Speed Test, 7.5 percent; Under Tail Test, 13 percent. Scored 80/100 on written test, 79/100 on practical and oral tests, graded 204/250 on \"ability as firer\" and 124/150 on \"qualities as an NCO.\" Placed third in a class of 24. \"Above average student - good appearance - quiet - reliable.\" At ITS during pilot training described as follows: \"Has had a good influence on trainees. Has marked ability to learn and retain. Should do well at any aircrew position. Dependable. Second aircrew recommendation, Air Navigator.\" (W/C J. Hatchet-Taylor). At No.20 EFTS flew Tiger Moths - 34 hours 20 minutes day dual (nine hours 30 minutes dual to first solo), 37 hours 30 minutes day solo, three hours night dual, ten minutes night solo plus ten hours 30 minutes in Link. Ten hours flown on instruments four hours ten minutes on dual navigation, 90 minutes on solo navigation. Chief Supervisory Officer wrote, \"Overcontrols the airspeed under the hood. Could improve aerobatics. Was slow to learn due to lack of confidence in himself.\" At No.5 SFTS flew Ansons - 66 hours 25 minutes day dual (seven hours to first solo), 50 hours 30 minutes day solo, ten hours ten minutes night dual and five hours twenty minutes night solo. Of these times, ten hours on formation flying, 26 hours 20 minutes on instruments; 11 hours ten minutes on dual navigation, 18 hours five minutes on solo navigation. Also logged 25 hours in Link and 25 hours 20 minutes as passenger. Chief Instructor wrote, \"A good average pilot who has worked conscientiously. Average standing in G.I.S. A quiet, retiring but very reliable officer. Will do well on operations.\" Circumstances of death: Involved in mid-air collision, 1005 hours, with another Oxford (X6871); both machines interlocked and in this position spun into the ground and caught fire. Pilot was 122251 F/O R.C. Wood, pupil pilot was 564068 Warrant Officer D.J. Innes-Smith, and Banks was along as a passenger. Killed in the other aircraft were 1148948 Sergeant J. Brook (pilot) and R132245 Sergeant L.A. Boire (pupil pilot). A witness (F/O A. Saward) testified that although he saw only one Oxford ahead of him, distance one mile, he then saw \"what appeared to be a large biplane spin into the ground.\" Squadron Leader A.W.S. Brown wrote: At 1100 hours on 3rd June 1943 I went to the crash to carry out a technical inspection. I found that the remains of two Oxford aircraft (later identified as V3821 and X6871) lay together. The aircraft were almost completely destroyed by fire. The engines were burnt out. The charred remains of the main spars of each mainplane lay across the other, the point of intersection being between one engine mounting and the nearer wingtip on each mainplane. From the wreckage it is not possible to identify any technical defect which may have contributed to the cause of the accident.