CALOW, Corporal (now FS) Thomas Arthur (Can 364) - British Empire Medal - Station Dartmouth - Award effective 11 June 1942 as per Canada Gazette of that date and AFRO 1000-1001/42 dated 3 July 1942. Born in Edmonton; brought up in Langley Prairie and White Rock, British Columbia. Enlisted in Vancouver, June 1937, although home given as Winnipeg ar time of award. Qualified for Atlantic Star. Medal presented 3 December 1942. Subsequently commissioned in Telecommunications (C25626). With Eastern Air Command as of 27 January 1946. Remained in postwar RCAF, attaining rank of Flight Lieutenant (1 June 1948) and Squadron Leader (1 January 1952). To No.2 Air Command, 7 September 1946. To Winnipeg, 1 March 1947. To Station Edmonton, 1 June 1947. To Northwest Air Command, 4 October 1949. To Rockcliffe, 21 February 1950. To Training Command Headquarters, 16 July 1953. Received Queens Coronation Medal, 23 October 1953 while with Training Command. Retired 28 April 1966 to Burnaby, British Columbia. Became a Customs and Excise Officer, finally retiring in 1980. Died in Saanich, British Columbia, 16 September 2009. On 17th September, 1939, this NCO was wireless operator on a Stranraer which made a forced landing in the sea. During 22 hours, suffering from exposure, sickness and cold, Corporal Calow stuck to his post through this long period and was unceasing in his efforts to reach the base and the various DF stations in the area. His devotion to duty is of the highest order. The following is text of a letter dated 25 September 1939, S/L R.C. Mair to Commanding Officer, No.5 (BR) Squadron (Dartmouth) reporting on loss of Stranraer 911. 1. Stranraer 911 was ordered to take off at 0515 hours, 17-9-39, to intercept convoy, carry out outer anti-submarine patrol, and after being relieved, proceed to Sable Island to refuel, arriving at 1200 hours. Stranraer 911 was to take off again at 1655 hours, intercept convoy again, carry out relative sector anti-submarine patrol, returning to base at 2345 hours. 2. Stranraer 911 with the following crew: Squadron Leader R.C. Mair Flying Officer W.H. Stapley No.364 Cpl Calow, A. No.2310 AC1 Pomes, S.J. No.347 LAC Daniels, J.A. No.2229 AC1 Hornick, J.W. No,2356 AC1 Magnus, R.C. No.11563 AC2 Alexander, R.L. No.11559 AC2 Phillips, W.F. Took off at 0520 hours, 17-9-39 and proceeded to intercept convoy. The weather was very hazy, visibility being only three or four miles. The automatic controls were not working. At the estimated point of interception, the convoy could not be seen, so a square search using a virtual visibility of four miles was carried out for approximately two hours. The convoy not being sighted, course was set for Sable Island at 0932 hours. Sable Island was not sighted at the estimated time of arrival, 1026 hours, and course was immediately set for the nearest point of the mainland. Two points of land were sighted and recognized as Cape Ray, Newfoundland and Cape North, Cape Breton Island. Course was then altered in the direction of Sydney, Nova Scotia, and since it was becoming increasingly evident that a forced alighting due to lack of fuel was imminent, the captain and the armourer both attempted to jettison the bomb load, while the navigator attempted to send an SOS to base. The attempts to jettison the bomb load failed, and the wireless operator was unable to obtain a reply to his call. At this point the engines began to fail and the pilot turned into wind and alighted at 1225 hours. A drogue was streamed from the nose of the aircraft, while the armourer released the bombs by disconnecting the carriers. A message giving our estimated position and requesting help was prepared and attached to one of the carrier pigeons, which was released. Another drogue was attached to the anchor chain to be in readiness if necessary. A sleeping robe bag was filled with engine oil and streamed from the nose. The air raft was inflated and tied atop of the cabin. The officers then took turns standing watch with alternate members of the crew as assistants. The wireless operator continued to send out calls for assistance, but due to static, no reply was received until about 2330 hours, when contact with the base at Dartmouth was established. 3. At approximately 2345 hours, the first drogue carried away and it was necessary to stream the remaining one. 4. The wireless operator continued his efforts with the base and also in obtaining D/F bearings. 5. At 0705 hours, a Delta seaplane was sighted about five miles on our port beam. This was reported by radio to Sydney, while an attempt was made to attract the pilot’s attention by Aldis lamp. 6. At 0720 hours the remaining drogue carried away, and the anchor was re-attached to the chain and dropped over to its full length. A box of reconnaissance flares was attached to a rope and was streamed from the nose as a make-shift drogue. While this was being attempted, the port aileron was forced under water and broken. The sink bucket was attached to a rope also and streamed from the nose. These makeshift drogues worked quite satisfactorily. 7. At about 1000 hours, a tanker was sighted about five miles away on our starboard bow. Attempts were made to attract his attention by flares and Aldis lamp, but no reply was observed. At the same time the wireless operator told Sydney that we could see the vessel and gave our approximate position from the tanker. The operator then heard Sydney telling the vessel where we were, and shortly after the tanker was observed to be changing course in our direction. Sydney then asked if the SOS could be cleared for other ships. This was agreed to. 8. Two Delta seaplanes were observed to be circling the tanker. It was learned from O.C. No.8 (General Purpose) Squadron later, that although these aircraft knew the Stranraer was only a few miles from the tanker, they were unable to see it. 9. On observing that the tanker was Swedish, all secret documents were weighted and thrown overboard. The tanker’s lifeboat came as close as possible and indicated that he could not come alongside. The crew then jumped it and with the help of their life-jackets, swam to the lifeboat. On arriving aboard the tanker, the aircraft crew were exceptionally well cared for, being given dry clothing, food and stimulants. The Master of the tanker, Pollux, Captain Adolf Olsen, decided that it was impossible for him to attempt salvage of the aircraft, the seas being 25 to 35 feet. 10. For the remainder of the afternoon, the Pollux stood by the aircraft, awaiting the arrival of the tug, Cruizer, from Louisburg, Nova Scotia. When the tug arrived, it was too rough to attempt salvage, or to transfer the aircraft crew from the tanker. The followed the tug to a lee of land behind Scatari Island, where the crew were transferred to the tug and proceeded to Louisburg. The aircraft crew proceeded to Sydney, by taxi, reporting to O.C. No.8 (General Purpose) Squadron upon arrival, while the tug, Cruizer, with Lieutenant-Commander Coleman prepared to attempt salvage at dawn the following morning. 11. The aircrew crew remained in Sydney until word was received from O.C. No.8 (General Purpose) Squadron that the aircraft had sunk and they were to proceed to Halifax by the next train. 12. It is desired to bring attention to the outstanding work and devotion to duty of No.364 Corporal Calow, A., the wireless operator. This Non-Commissioned Officer was continuously on duty at his wireless set from the time of take-off, 0520 hours, 17-9-39 until rescued at 1045 hours, 18-9-39. 13. It is pointed out that the Pollux was kept from her normal work for a considerable period of time, and that her lifeboat was severely damaged, due to the roughness of the sea, while it was being hoisted aboard after the rescue. The boatswain sustained an injury to his eye while launching the lifeboat. It is strongly recommended that official recognition be given to Captain Adolf Olsen, and to Chief Officer Fred Lundgren, coxswain of the lifeboat, in view of the efficient rescue work under difficult circumstances, and the most excellent treatment accorded to the rescued crew. Letter dated 26 September 1939 from N.R. Anderson (Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command) to AFHQ in Ottawa: Stranraer 911 was forced to alight at sea at 1255 hours on the 17th September 1939, approximately midway between Cape North and Cape Ray, Cabot Strait, on exhaustion of the fuel supply. The aircraft missed the Nova Scotia coast on returning from an attempted Outer Anti-Submarine Patrol for a convoy. Changes in wind direction and velocity of considerable magnitude occurred as the aircraft proceeded from the coast on the outward flight. Accurate drift readings could not be obtained at sea owing to poor visibility. The aircraft’s calls for assistance were not picked up by the Department of Transport Marine Stations close-by or the Squadron W/T Station from the time the aircraft landed at 1255 hours until 2250 hours, 17th September, owing to a bad electrical and wind storm which swept the Nova Scotia Coast, starting at approximately 1300 hours the same date. A contributing factor in the non-receipt of the aircraft’s S.O.S. calls by the Department of Transport Marine Stations in the vicinity may be attributed to the type of receiver with which these stations are equipped, as explained in paragraph 3 of the W/T Communication Report submitted by WO II Stephens. Immediately the aircraft’s position became known arrangements were made for the Sydney rescue boats “DETECTOR” and “SCATARI” to proceed to the rescue, although sea conditions were unfavourable for the operation of these boats. The Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, R.C.N., Halifax, also very kindly sent two of their boats out from Sydney for the same purpose. These boats did not make contact with the aircraft and were forced to return to harbour owing to deterioration of sea conditions. At approximately 1030 hours on September 18th the Swedish tanker “POLLUX” was directed by wireless to the aircraft’s position and the crew of the aircraft were picked up by the tanker’s life boat after swimming from the aircraft to the life boat, as it was impossible for the life boat to go alongside the aircraft owing to the heavy seas. The Swedish tanker stood by the aircraft for the remainder of the day waiting the arrival of the tug “CRUISER”. On arrival of the tug at approximately 1930 hours, the sea was too rough to attempt salvage of the aircraft, so the aircraft’s crew was transferred from the Swedish tanker to the tug in the lee of Scatari Island and the tug proceeded to Louisburg Harbour, arriving approximately 2200 hours. At dawn on September 19th the tug again proceeded to sea from Louisburg to locate and salvage the aircraft. Members of the aircraft crew were not physically fir to go with the tug, having been seasick and without sleep for at least 42 hours before they landed at Louisburg. After a gallant effort the tug secured a towing line to the aircraft and proceeded slowly towards harbour but the aircraft filled and sank at 1730 hours. The Master and crew of the tug and the Naval officers on board are to be commended on their efforts to salvage Stranraer 911. The morale of the crew of the aircraft remained high throughout their trying experience. The devotion to duty of No,304 Corporal Calow, T.A., wireless operator on the Stranraer, is particularly brought to attention. This N.C.O. was continuously on duty at his wireless set from the time of take-off at 0520 hours, 17th September, until the crew were rescued at 1045 hours on the 18th September. He is recommended for the Air Force Medal. The efficient rescue work of Captain A. Olsen, of the Swedish tanker “POLLUX”, and his Chief Officer, F. Lundgren under difficult conditions is also worthy of acknowledgement by the Department. The loss of the Stranraer must be attributed to these hazards of Active Service flying which now apply to all aircraft undertaking General Reconnaissance Patrols over the sea on the East Coast of Canada. Improvement in the operation equipment of the Command, particularly wireless equipment and D/F facilities, will reduce present hazards. No blame can be attributed to the crew of the aircraft in any way. Two other Stranraers experienced the same difficulty in accurate navigation on that date owing to poor visibility and change in wind direction and velocity and they were very fortunate in being able to make a land-fall, although they did not return to their base until the next day. The ability of the Stranraer to remain afloat in very heavy seas is the outstanding point brought out in the loss of 911. The aircraft might have come through the tests without damage had the sea drogues held under the strain. A further letter, undated but evidently written 25 or 26 September 1939 (S/L A.D. Ross, Commanding Officer, No.5 Squadron to Commanding Officer, Station Dartmouth) discuses both the lessons to be learned from the incident and the uncertainty surrounding the state of awards at that time. It is apparent that the loss of this aircraft was caused by a number of factors namely:- (a) Rapidly changing weather conditions ultimately resulting in a very rough sea (b) Insufficient navigation facilities to accurately determine the wind. (c) Lack of proper towing facilities when salvage of the aircraft was attempted. With regard to (b) above, it is pointed out that the small sea markers issued for use in wind finding were of little use on the September 17th, 1939, owing to the sea that was running at that time. With regard to the remarks contained in Para. 12 of Squadron Leader Mair’s report respecting No.364 Cpl. Calow, A., it is strongly recommended that this N.C.O. received some recognition of the splendid effort he put forth on this occasion. It is not known what the policy of the present government is with respect to the awarding of medals to members of the Force on Active Service. It is recommended, however, that this N.C.O. be awarded the Air Force Medal or, if this is not possible, that he receive other recognition in the form of accelerated promotion.